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Abstract
To which extent high performances in professional sports are based on the use of
illicit substances or other doping practices is extremely difficult to measure empiri-
cally. Game-theoretical approaches predict strong incentives to dope based on the
interaction among athletes (prisoner’s dilemma) or the interaction between some
control organization and the athletes (inspection game). The role of stakeholders
such as customers, sponsors, and the media is either ignored or only informally dis-
cussed. One might think that customers who are ready to withdraw their support
after a doping scandal, would reduce the incentives to dope. We explicitly model the
strategic interaction of such customers with athletes and organizers and strongly re-
fute this (optimistic) conjecture. Customers even trigger doping by putting a threat
on the organizers not to conduct serious doping tests. However, we show that this
result can be altered by a change in the information structure. If transparency
about doping tests is established, then there is a doping-free equilibrium. This has
practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies, as well as for other
situations of fraudulent activities.
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1 Introduction
When fraudulent activities are detected in some organization, the customers have to make
a decision. Either they continue the relationship with this organization or they boycott it.
Behaving in the latter way, i.e. reacting to scandals with a withdrawal of support, can be
expected to reduce the extent of fraudulent activities (since the potential loss increases).
As we will show in this paper, however, the effect might just go into the opposite direction:
Critical customers who withdraw support after a scandal unintendedly trigger fraudulent
activities. This conclusion is formally derived from a game-theoretic model which extends
the standard inspection game by an additional player.1 We carefully analyze and discuss
this model focusing on the example of doping in professional sports.
Motivation Sport events, such as the Olympic Games, have grown to a size of sub-
stantial economic importance. Thereby the use of performance-enhancing drugs (doping)
is considered as a risk for the sports industry. There are at least three reasons why it is
socially desirable to reduce the extent of doping (cf. Preston and Szymanski, 2003). First,
as it is well known, the use of performance-enhancing drugs can lead to serious health
problems for the athletes. Second, athletes often serve as role models. Thus, a doped
athlete is neither in the best interest of parents nor would she give the right image for a
sponsoring company. Closely linked to that point is the third argument: An important
character of sport is that it becomes uninteresting if athletes systematically violate the
rules.2 Even if most doping substances were legalized, there need to be some rules that
define a discipline and systematic violations of these rules are undesirable. Thus, it is not
surprising that even the United Nations and the European Commission are highly inter-
ested in anti-doping policies. The most important scientific questions on doping concern
(i) the actual extent of doping – whether the use of performance-enhancing drugs is an
exceptional practice of some delinquent athletes or a common practice – and they concern
(ii) instruments to reduce the extent of doping.
Empirical studies about doping are rare because it is very hard to collect data of a
high quality. Those few studies that try to assess the extent of doping empirically, make
estimations that often strongly exceed the public perception (Pitsch et al., 2007; Striegel
et al., 2010; Pitsch and Emrich, 2011).3 Theoretical approaches to the doping issue have
acknowledged that decisions to dope are not independent of decisions of other actors such
as other athletes or control agencies. Game theory provides tools to analyze such sit-
uations of strategic interaction. The primary focus is thereby given to the interaction
between athletes. This is often modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma, where to dope is the
dominant strategy (Breivik, 1992; Haugen, 2004).4 Extending this approach, game the-
ory is also used to analyze the interaction between athletes and an organization which
decides upon conducting doping tests. This is usually modeled as an inspection game
1Inspection games are discussed by Dresher (1962), Maschler (1967), Tsebelis (1989), and Avenhaus
et al. (2002), among others.
2As a survey on the Olympic Games shows, spectators, fans etc. want to see records and high perfor-
mances but only under compliance of the rules (Messing and Mu¨ller, 1996).
3E.g. Striegel et al. (2010) found an eight times higher number of drug abuse than it is officially
confirmed.
4Exceptions to the prisoner’s dilemma occur if athletes can be sure to be detected when doped or
when athletes have values or norms that exclude doping as a real alternative (Bird and Wagner, 1997;
Eber, 2008).
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(Berentsen et al., 2008; Kirstein, 2012). In an inspection game there is no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium because athletes want to dope without being detected, while the control
organization tries to detect doping without testing clean athletes. Thus, mixed strategy
equilibria are used to predict the extent of doping in dependence of the benefits and costs.
Our Contribution We build on the previous game-theoretic work on doping but take
the analysis one level further by introducing customers as an additional player into the
game. Customers are highly important because they finally make professional sports eco-
nomically viable. Consider a sports event from which customers turn away their interest.
This event does not only suffer of less ticket and merchandise revenues, it will also become
less attractive for media companies who report from the event and for companies who
sponsor the event. In sum, this implies a substantial loss for the organizers of the sports
event as well as for the athletes. We have seen a similar scenario in the recent history of
the Tour de France, the world’s most famous cycling race. Studying this case suggests
that the large number of doping scandals has had an important role in reducing the sup-
port of stakeholders. For many other disciplines and events, this scenario – withdrawal
of stakeholder support because of doping – has not happened. However, it seems to be
always present as a threat.5 Despite their essential role, previous studies (to the best of
our knowledge) have not included customers as a player in a game-theoretic approach to
doping. This paper closes this gap and explicitly analyzes the role of customers for the
incentives to dope.
In our model customers support a sports event as long as there is no doping scandal.
After a scandal we assume that customers would withdraw their support (and contrast
this case from non-critical customers who always keep supporting). One might conjecture
that the behavior of critical customers induces incentives for organizers and athletes to
avoid doping since this increases the costs of doping for both athletes and organizers.
However, our analysis reveals that the opposite is true: Under mild assumptions the
unique outcome of the game is that athletes dope, while organizers make insufficent effort
to test them. Because our assumptions are very parsimonious, this result is robust against
many changes in the specification of utility. The intuition is simply that customers who
can withdraw their support constitute a threat to the organizers such that they avoid
uncovering (the full extent of) doping.
We then investigate how to change the structure of the game in order to support a
doping-free equilibrium. It turns out that an establishing transparency is sufficient for
this purpose: If customers can observe whether there were serious doping tests, even if
they turned out to be negative, then there is a doping-free equilibrium. However, this
equilibrium is not unique – there is still an equilibrium involving doping. To rule out all
doping equilibria it would be necessary to change the preferences of the customers (not
only their information structure): They should prefer to withdraw their support not only
after a doping scandal, but also after the suspicion of doping, i.e. they should insist that
strong efforts to detect and punish dopers are made. We discuss the real world predictions
of this model and the practical implications of its results for currently debated anti-doping
policies.
5Empirical evidence on the Olympic Games shows that a majority of customers indeed considers
doping as a threat (Messing and Mu¨ller, 1996; Messing et al., 2008).
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Related Literature There is already a rich body of game-theoretic literature on doping
incentives. One category of models focuses on (symmetric or asymmetric) games between
athletes. The second category analyzes the strategic interaction between athletes and
control institutions. Our model differs from both of these categories by integrating cus-
tomers as an additional type of player. This is not an alternative, but rather an extension
of what has been studied previously.
For the first category, pioneer work stems from Breivik (1992) who studies several two-
player games between athletes. A typical conceptualization of the strategic interaction is
the prisoner’s dilemma game, where to dope is the dominant strategy (see also Haugen,
2004). An athlete only plays “no doping” if preferences of players are different (e.g.
because of fairness considerations) (Breivik, 1992). Eber and The´pot (1999) also examine
a 2 × 2 game between athletes. The payoffs are assumed to depend on the prizes, the
number of events during the season, the probability of being caught, and perceived costs.
For some parameters the payoffs are as in a prisoner’s dilemma. Similarly, Bird and
Wagner (1997) consider doping as a common pool resource dilemma.
An alternative way was proposed by Berentsen (2002) who introduces a two-player
game in which two athletes have unequal probabilities to win (based on their physical abil-
ities). Berentsen (2002) presents this asymmetric game in a world where doping would not
be punished or else according to a punishment scheme resembling the official punishments
of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). He finds a mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which the favored player is more likely to dope. Berentsen and Lengwiler (2004) also use
a bimatrix game to study the interaction among unequally talented athletes. Depending
on the parameter values, they find different equilibria which are stable under replicator
dynamics. Interestingly, Berentsen and Lengwiler (2004) find that increasing the punish-
ments for using performance-enhancing drugs might increase the extent of doping in some
cases. Finally, Kra¨kel (2007) studies two heterogeneous athletes in a tournament game.
Determinants of a doping-free equilibrium were analyzed because it could be assumed
that such an equilibrium leads to high social welfare.
In the second category of models, for the interaction between athletes and some control
organization, often an inspection game is considered.6 In an inspection game an inspectee
has to decide whether to comply to or deviate from a norm, while an inspector can
choose between inspecting or not inspecting the action.7 Kirstein (2012) investigates an
inspection game where the detection technology is not free of errors. The possibility
of two types of errors leads to additional perfect Bayesian equilibria. Berentsen et al.
(2008) extend an inspection game by a “whistleblowing” stage, in which the loser is
asked whether the winner has doped or not. They compare Bayesian equilibria in games
with and without this stage. Under whistleblowing they find a reduction of doping,
while inspection costs are reduced. Eber (2002) compares the credibility of the anti-
doping agency with the credibility of monetary policies. Within his model athletes form
rational expectations about the effort of authorities to prevent doping which leads to a
credibility problem (Eber, 2002). Similarly, Maennig (2002) uses a model which describes
illicit behavior to analyze how officials or athletes behave if they are corrupt or doped.
6The fact that in the inspection game there is only one athlete does not mean that the ideas from the
strategic interaction between athletes are neglected. In particular, it is assumed that under no controls
athletes prefer to dope, which is based on considerations of competition among athletes.
7For general information on inspection games we refer the reader to Tsebelis (1989) and Avenhaus
et al. (2002).
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Especially for doping Maennig (2002) points out that costs of being punished are smaller
than the expected benefits from doping. Pitsch et al. (2010) use a similar model to
analyze the decisions of dealers and consumers in national doping markets considering
different European anti-doping laws. They identify two types of athletes: consistent (or:
unconditional) non-dopers and calculating dopers. Finally, Preston and Szymanski (2003)
discuss the asymmetric information problem in commercial sports. They argue that a lack
of enforcement and punishment leads to a low detection rate for cheating athletes.
If we consider the evolution of doping games as (1) models of strategic interaction
between athletes and (2) models of strategic interaction between athletes and some control
organization, then our contribution is to add a third level: (3) a model of strategic
interaction between athletes, control organization, and customers. Our model is thereby
kept very simple and is, in fact, simpler to analyze than many of the previous models. This
is due to the fact that most of the works report on comparative statics (e.g. how mixed
equilibrium strategies are affected by a change in payoffs), while we obtain a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium that is robust against small parameter changes. Before we introduce
the model – a game including customers –, let us briefly examine some empirical evidence
on the role of customers concerning doping.
Some Evidence on the Importance of Customers Customers of a sports event
do not only expect high performances from the athletes but also their compliance to the
rules. During the Olympic Games in Barcelona 1992, for example, 91% of 475 interviewed
spectators answered that they want to see high performances at the Olympic Games, but
a majority of them (58%) considers doping as a threat to the Games (Messing and Mu¨ller,
1996). For the Olympic Games of Sydney 2000 and Athens 2004 the number of people
who agrees that doping is a threat has even increased to 69% and 82% (Messing et al.,
2008). This view is not restricted to spectators, but it is also predominantly shared by
athletes, students of sports science, and media representatives (Tro¨ger, 2006). But what
is the actual “threat” that starts out from doping in sports? Probably this scenario can
be best studied in an event, for which it is known that doping is widespread – such as the
world’s most famous cycling tour, the Tour de France.
The recent exposure of the doping affair concerning the seven-times Tour de France
winner (Lance Armstrong) is just one very spectacular case in a long list of disclosures.
In 1998 a whole cycling team (Festina) was excluded from the Tour de France after a
large amount of performance-enhancing drugs was found in a team car. In the 2006 Tour
de France, an affair centered on a physician (Eufemiano Fuentes) led to the expulsion of
several participants and some days after the Tour de France 2006, it was detected that
the winner (Floyd Landis) was positively tested on performance-enhancing drugs. One
year after, the German public-sector TV channel quit the live-broadcast of that actual
Tour de France when a German cyclist (Patrik Sinkewitz) was convicted on doping. Al-
though this TV channel reported from the Tour de France again in the years 2008 until
2011, they finally quit in 2012. The reason for that was a sharp decline in the audience
ratings.8 Not only TV channels, also sponsors reacted with exit. For example, the cy-
cling team-sponsor Phonak quit, after their team leader (Floyd Landis) was convicted
of doping, and a German cycling team-sponsor (Gerolsteiner) quit after two German cy-
8While the market share amounted to 13 percent in year 2008, there was a decline to approximately
9 percent in 2009. The first reaction of the TV channels was a reduction of airtime.
5
clists (Stefan Schumacher, Bernhard Kohl) were found guilty. Thus, the recent history of
cycling demonstrates that the reaction to the disclosures of systematic doping practices
is the withdrawal of support from several stakeholders. This is true for media compa-
nies, sponsors, and – last but not least – customers. It is a notable fact that there are
customers who still support the Tour de France despite (or maybe even because of) the
doping scandals. However, it seems undeniable that the organizers of the event have
suffered substantial losses due to the withdrawal of support of many customers, sponsors
and media companies.
Similar scenarios of withdrawal of support have not happened in most of the other
disciplines. As the recent Olympic Games in London show, the interest in sports and,
particularly, in track and field athletics is huge. This does not mean that track and field
athletics is free of doping. For example, the US sprinter Justin Gatlin who sprinted to
his personal best in London has a background on doping delicti.9
This case is not that exceptional: among 64 world class sprinters on the 100 meters
track Dilger and Tolsdorf (2004) found that 16, i.e. 25%, have been convicted on doping
somewhen in the period from 1997 until 2002. It seems that, despite such cases, the public
perception in athletics is that most of the athletes do not use performance-enhancing sub-
stances.10 For example, in the year 1988 the most prominent 100 meters track star Ben
Johnson was convicted on doping, while during the next Olympic Games (in Barcelona
1992) only every fourth or fifth spectator (22%) agreed that doping and manipulation
are determining factors of the Olympic performances (Messing and Mu¨ller, 1996). The
public perception of clean sport seems crucial for customers and other stakeholders to
keep their support. Concerning the Tour de France, most of the TV spectators (89%)
in a survey assumed that doping is a common practice in cycling.11 This seems to be a
crucial difference to most of the other disciplines and events, such as professional Tennis
or Football, where doping is rarely a topic at all. However, the threat of customers with-
drawing their support, is always of substantial size in professional sports. For example,
in Germany the entrance fees for sport events amounted to 4 billion euros in 2010. More-
over, 5.5 billion euros were spent on promotion, sponsoring and media rights. Roughly,
every third German enterprise supports sport.12 In other countries including the United
States the revenues of professional sports are even higher.13 Thus, customers and other
stakeholders are making professional sports events economically viable. Their critical role
is the potential withdrawal of support. This is exactly the aspect of customers that is
9He was first convicted in 2001 and was suspended for one year. In 2006, Gaitlin was found guilty on
doping again and had to expect a ban for the entire career, but only received a four year sentence after
some collaboration with the national doping agency of the United States (USADA).
10Although many experts do not agree to this view, e.g. the German sport-sociologist and honorary
president of the German athletics association (DLV), Helmut Digel, argues that doping is and was a
huge problem in professional sports in Germany. The interview conducted by a German newspaper
can be found at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/sport/sportpolitik/doping/helmut-digel-alle-wussten-vom-
betrug-im-westen-11966739.html (last access: December 1st, 2012).
11These figures are reported by a German newspaper and can be found at
http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/28/tour-de-france-medienkritik (last access: December 1st, 2012).
12cf. Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, monthly report, February, 2012.
13In 2010 the National Football League (NFL) had revenues about 7.8 billion US dollars, the Major
League Baseball (MLB) earned 6.8 billion US dollar, the National Basketball Association (NBA) earned
4.0 billion US dollars, and the National Hockey League (NHL) earned 3 billions US dollars. A major part
from these revenues is realized by TV rights, e.g. the NFL receives 3.1 billions US dollars from the four
biggest Networks (CBS, ESPN, Fox and NBC) per Season.
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incorporated in our model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 establishes the main results, thereby characterizing the doping equilibrium.
Section 4 studies a variation of the model, which admits a doping-free equilibrium. In
Section 5 we conclude.
2 Model
Considering benefits from professional sports, there is a large set of stakeholders: sports
associations, team sponsors, event organizers, event sponsors, media, spectators, anti-
doping agencies, doctors, politicians, etc. In our model we restrict attention to three
types of players: Athletes, Organizers, and Customers. Athletes can decide between
doping and staying clean, whereas doping is defined as the use of illicit substances or
methods.14
The binary decision to dope or not to dope is a simplification of a set of decisions
which might also be considered as gradual. The simplification can be justified by at least
two reasons. First, it is often unambiguous whether an athlete uses illicit substances or
not. Second, there is a subjective interpretation of whether the athlete considers that
he/she cheats or not.
In our model Organizers represent those actors who decide whether to conduct serious
doping tests or not. Thus, testing stands for systematically attempting to detect and pun-
ish doped Athletes. An Organizer in that sense is the world anti-doping agency WADA.15
In several disciplines, the national anti-doping agencies (NADAs) have a major role in
organizing doping tests of their athletes. In other disciplines, the sports associations or
the event organizers are the key players in organizing systematic doping tests.16 Conse-
quently, Organizers in our model represent anti-doping agencies, as well as organizers of
sports events and sports associations. Indeed, anti-doping agencies are not independent
of theses organizations (Eber, 2002; Preston and Szymanski, 2003); and with respect to
the decision we study here, they have similar interests.
Customers can decide upon staying a supporter or to withdraw support, e.g. not
to continue watching an event on TV, not to further buy merchandise products, or to
quit a membership in a club of supporters. Besides spectators, we could also subsume
sponsors and the media (who broadcast or report about the sport events) under the term
Customers. A withdrawal of each of these three actors can trigger the withdrawal of
the two others. Sport events cannot survive without sponsors, withdrawal of the media
restricts the access of the customers, and finally sport is only attractive for sponsors
as long as there are customers. To make the arguments as clear as possible we focus
on one representative customer and we also study only one representative organizer and
one representative athlete (such that the strategic interaction between athletes is only
presented in a highly reduced form). The extension to multiple players of a type would
not qualitatively affect the results, but it would affect the ease of illustration. Therefore,
14The definition of doping is itself an issue that is worth a discourse (Eber, 2006).
15The WADA is an international institution founded in 1999 in Lausanne. Its main task is the world-
wide coordination of anti-doping activities such as detection, deterrence and prevention. Moreover, the
WADA coordinates doping tests with national anti-doping agencies (NADAs).
16For a richer description of the institutional setting see Emrich and Pierdzioch (2012).
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we interpret the behavior of a representative player as the behavior of the Athletes, the
Organizers, and the Customers (in plural).
The timing of the players’ actions is as illustrated in Figure 1. First, Athletes de-
cide on doping, then Organizers decide on testing, and finally Customers decide upon
staying. The information set of the Organizers indicates that they do not observe the
action of Athletes. Thus, the moves of Athletes and Organizers can also be considered as
being simultaneously. In our model testing means that a doped Athlete is detected and
punished.17 If the history in this first stage is (Dope, Test) we call it a “scandal.” All
other histories, i.e. (Dope,Notest), (Clean, Test), (Clean,Notest), are no scandal. Since
doping tests and their outcomes are not transparent to the public, Customers cannot dis-
tinguish between the three possible histories if there was no scandal.18 This is captured
by the information set consisting of three nodes. As Figure 1 shows, this game has eight
potential outcomes, which we label in the following way: d-t-s, d-t-l, d-n-s, d-n-l and c-t-s,
c-t-l, c-n-s, c-n-l as also illustrated in Figure 1.
While Athletes and Organizers have two strategies each {Dope, Clean}, respectively
{Test,Notest}, Customers can choose between two actions in two information sets, which
yields four strategies. We denote them by {SS, SL, LS, LL}, where, for instance, LS
stands for action Leave in the first information set (after a scandal) and action Stay in
the second information set (after no scandal).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
To analyze the model we employ the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
In contrast to other doping games, there is no need to consider mixed strategies. We have
not yet not specified the players’ utility functions or preferences. We will introduce such
assumptions step-by-step to clarify that mild assumptions are sufficient for some results
(equilibrium), while stronger assumptions are needed for others (inefficiency). Moreover,
we do not specify cardinal utility levels, i.e. absolute payoffs, because this is not in line
with a stepwise procedure and it would force us to specify many assumptions that are
not at all necessary. The advantage of such a parsimonious approach is that eventually
derived results are robust against changes of specification details.
3.1 Existence of a Doping Equilibrium
We are most interested in the kind of Customers who withdraw their support after a
scandal but not otherwise. This idea is covered by assumption A1 which makes mild
assumptions on the preferences of all the players.
17The assumption that the test technology is free of mistakes and the assumption that any positively
tested athlete is really punished is not realistic, but it rather introduces a bias in direction of avoiding
doping. If we still find that Athletes dope in equilibrium, this seems a stronger result than without these
assumptions. Kirstein (2012) studies a model where doping tests are not free of errors.
18The fact that sometimes sport events publicly announce the number of tests they have carried through
does not contradict this assumption. Still, Customers do not know whether the Athletes have been
seriously and systematically tested.
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Figure 1: Structure of the game.
Assumption 1 (mild). For the players’ preferences we assume the following:
Ath: d-n-s Ath c-n-s, i.e. Athletes prefer to dope if not tested; and c-t-s Ath d-t-l, i.e.
Athletes prefer to be clean and tested, while Customers stay, over being doped and
tested, while Customers leave.
Org: d-n-s Org d-t-l, i.e. a scandal combined with the loss of Customers is worse for the
Organizers than undetected doping where Customers stay; and c-t-s Org c-n-l, i.e.
testing clean Athletes with Customers support is better for the Organizers than not
testing clean Athletes when Customers leave.
Cus: d-t-l Cus d-t-s, i.e. Customers prefer to withdraw support after a scandal; and d-n-s
Cus d-n-l, c-t-s Cus c-t-l, and c-n-s Cus c-n-l, i.e. Customers prefer to stay if
there is no scandal.
The assumptions A1 are easy to justify. The assumption that Athletes dope if there
are no tests follows from the standard assumption in the literature that the benefits of
doping exceed the costs even if there are tests (e.g. Maennig, 2002).19 Organizers might
existentially depend on Customers’ support such that they would probably prefer any
outcome where Customers stay (i.e. d-t-s, d-n-s, c-t-s, and c-n-s) over any outcome where
support is withdrawn (i.e. d-t-l, d-n-l, c-t-l, and c-n-l). This also means that testing is
not too expensive in the sense that the withdrawal of customer support is worse than
conducting tests. This assumption need not be satisfied for sport events that do not
belong to professional sports. The preference of the Customers to leave after a scandal
19This interaction between several Athletes is often modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. There the dom-
inant strategy is to dope, as we assume this behavior here for the case of no tests and one representative
Athlete. In reality, there are also Athletes who are unconditional non-dopers (Pitsch et al., 2010). Their
(trivial) behavior is not studied within our model.
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means that they are bothered by doping scandals, rather than enjoying them.20 Finally,
Customers’ preferences to stay if there was no scandal reflects the general interest in
sports based on the view that Customers are unable to distinguish between undetected
doping and clean sport even ex post. That is, their payoff of staying a supporter does
not depend on whether d-n-s, c-t-s, or c-n-s is reached because they cannot distinguish
between them. And similarly, their payoff of withdrawing their support would not depend
on whether outcome d-n-l, c-t-l, or c-n-l is reached.21 Given A1 a customer will stay a
supporter if and only if there was no scandal – the behavior under scrutiny. The following
proposition shows that outcome d-n-s – i.e. Athletes dope, Organizers do not test, and
Customers stay supporters – is an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 (doping equilibrium). Under Assumptions A1 s∗ := (Dope,Notest, LS)
is a SPNE.
Proof. The only proper subgame of our game starts at node “scandal” (Dope, Test). L is
a Nash equilibrium (NE) in this trivial subgame. The second subgame is the game itself.
Suppose Customers play LS in this game.








Now, it can be immediately observed that by applying A1, Athletes dope and Orga-
nizers do not test are mutual best responses since d-n-s Ath c-n-s and d-n-s Org d-t-l.
Moreover, LS is a best response to (Dope,Notest) because by A1 it holds that d-n-s Cus
d-n-l.
The intuition for Proposition 1 becomes apparent when contrasting the result with the
standard inspection game. In an inspection game an inspectee has to decide whether to
comply or deviate from a norm, while an inspector can choose between inspecting or not
inspecting the action. To embed this standard game into our notation we would consider
the Athlete as the inspectee, the Organizer as the inspector and for the Customers which
are standardly excluded, we would assume constant behavior. That is, our model differs
from the standard inspection game only in that Customers sometimes withdraw support,
while standardly Customers always stay supporter or, alternatively, they never support
such that we would get the matrix
20In reality there might be Customers who enjoy (doping) scandals. We will consider such customers
and, equivalently, uncritical customers, who always stay supporters, as a benchmark later on. However,
we study a more critical kind of Customers here.
21A similar interpretation holds if we consider sponsors and media companies in the role of the Cus-
tomers. Moreover, there is a second interpretation of this assumption for these actors. It might be that
they are able to distinguish ex post between different outcomes, but do not strongly care about doping








respectively the same matrix where in each outcome -s is replaced by -l.
The standard assumptions made in the inspection game concern only the Athletes and
the Organizers and are collected in A2.22
Assumption 2 (inspection). In the inspection game the following assumptions are made
on the preferences of Athletes and Organizers:
Ath: c-t-s Ath d-t-s and c-t-l Ath d-t-l, i.e. Athletes prefer not to dope if there are tests;
and d-n-s Ath c-n-s and d-n-l Ath c-n-l, i.e. Athletes prefer to dope if there are
no tests.
Org: d-t-s Org d-n-s and d-t-l Org d-n-l, i.e. Organizers prefer to test the Athletes if
they are doped; and c-n-s Org c-t-s and c-n-l Org c-t-l, i.e. Organizers prefer not
to test if Athletes are clean.
The Assumptions A2 are partially redundant with assumptions A1, but further specify
that Athletes prefer not to dope if tested and that Organizers prefer to test if and only
if Athletes are doped. This reflects that Organizers are willing to detect doping, while
testing is costly. In the inspection game (i.e. our model but with Customers who have
preferences such that they always support) best response dynamics would always follow
the cycle d-t-s ↪→ c-t-s ↪→ c-n-s ↪→ d-n-s ↪→ d-t-s ↪→ ..., i.e. counter-clockwise deviations
in Matrix (2). This is the classic observation in the inspection game that there is no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
This is different in our model, which is also an extended inspection game, but Cus-
tomers leave after a scandal. In our model there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium as
shown in Proposition 1. The reason can be seen from a comparison between Matrix (2)
and Matrix (1): Replacing d-t-s by d-t-l in the first matrix entry breaks the cycle of de-
viations when outcome d-n-s is reached because d-n-s Org d-t-l, while d-t-s Org d-n-s.
In words, Customers who leave after a scandal establish a threat to the Organizers such
that they prefer not to detect doped athletes, even if they would have done so in case
that the Customers were uncritical (i.e. in case when the Customers would always stay
as in the inspection game). Thus, the explanation for our qualitatively new result is that
the introduction of (critical) Customers undermines the Organizers’ incentives to uncover
(the full extent of) doping because Organizers anticipate that they would suffer losses in
the case of scandals. As a consequence athletes are not seriously tested and therefore
decide to dope.23
This result is not due to other explanatory factors since we assume that the doping
technology is free of errors, testing can be almost costless, the benefits of doping need not
22Usually, the inspection game is represented by numerical payoffs. This implies additional assumptions
to the ones collected here. However, those additional assumptions are neither consensual in the literature,
nor are they necessary for the results (because we are not looking for mixed strategy Nash equilibria).
23The practical implications of this observation are discussed in Section 3.3.
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be high, and the disutility of being detected can be huge. Importantly, our argument is not
that doped athletes produce higher performances which creates utility for the customers,
although this idea would not alter the result.
3.2 Uniqueness of the Doping Equilibrium
We have so far not discussed whether there are other equilibria. Proposition 2 excludes
this by use of the inspection game assumptions A2.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 hold.
Then s∗ = (Dope,Notest, LS) is the unique SPNE.
Proof of Proposition 2. s∗ = (Dope,Notest, LS) is a SPNE by Proposition 1. We show
uniqueness of s∗ by excluding all other strategy profiles from being an equilibrium. In
the subgame that starts with the scandal, Customers choose leave in equilibrium (by A1).
Thus, there are no SPNE where Customers play SS or SL. Given Customers play LL,
there is no mutual best response for Organizers and Athletes because this is an inspection
game situation (A2). Thus, only the four strategy profiles with Customers choosing LS
remain. A1 excludes (Dope, Test, SL) by d-t-l Cus d-t-s and (Clean, Test, SL) by c-t-s
Cus c-t-l from being an equilibrium. Finally, (Clean, Test, LS) is not an equilibrium
because c-n-s Org c-t-s (A2).
This result shows that the mild Assumptions A1 and the standard Assumptions A2
are powerful enough to rule out any equilibrium besides the previously found doping
equilibrium. Thus, the introduction of Customers to the inspection game accentuates
the extent of doping. While the mixed strategy equilibrium of the inspection game has
the interpretation that only a fraction of Athletes dope, our pure strategy equilibrium
predicts that all athletes (who are calculating dopers) dope. Let us now briefly discuss
the interpretation and implications of this result.
3.3 Discussion of the Doping Equilibrium
We have so far established that the unique equilibrium outcome is d-n-s – i.e. Athletes
dope, Organizers do not test, and Customers stay supporters. The real world prediction
of our simple model is thus that the number of dopers is large, while the probability of a
doped athlete to be caught and punished is close to zero. The real extent of doping within
professional sports is hard to assess and thus remains highly controversial. Theoretically,
there are strong incentives to use performance-enhancing drugs. In particular, if our
second prediction holds – that the probability of being detected and punished is small.24
The explanation that our model provides for doping is that organizers do not want to
uncover the full extent of doping because they anticipate that they would suffer losses in
the case of scandals.25
24In the absence of serious controls, athletes are in the classic (prisoner’s) dilemma because they either
can get a competitive advantage by doping or they have to assume that their rivals are doped (cf., e.g.,
Breivik, 1992).
25This line of reasoning supports the opinions of certain critical experts – e.g. the physician Frank So¨rgel
explicitly claims that sports associations and politics look away to preserve the sport’s reputation and
avoid potential financial losses (http://www.stern.de/sport/anti-doping-gesetz-initiieren-1920962.html,
last access: December 1st, 2012) – without being a theory of conspiracy.
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Our argument that Organizers lack the incentives for serious doping tests is in line
with Eber (2002) who constitutes that Organizers have a low effort bias, which becomes
stronger the more the authorities weight the economic stakes of professional sport.26 Eber
(2002) argues that Organizers should be “infinitely doping averse” and that even if they
attempt to seriously detect and punish, they face a credibility problem. One way to
increase the public credibility of anti-doping activities is to detect doping cases but very
few of them. Indeed, we have not included the idea that the conviction of a few athletes
enhances the credibility of clean sport. We have focused on the main effect, which is that
the conviction of many athletes undermines the credibility of a sports event or even of a
whole discipline. Importantly, we are not arguing that Organizers are unwilling to fight
against doping, but simply that they have strong incentives not to fully uncover doping
activities.
Our prediction that Organizers do not seriously test is also empirically difficult to
assess. However, there are several pieces of evidence that support this view. For example,
consider the anti-doping instrument called world anti-doping code (WADC). This is an
international regulatory system that specifies test procedures, and lists of forbidden sub-
stances, and accredits doping labs. (The WADC is an instrument of the world anti-doping
agency WADA and we assume for the moment that the WADA is free of incentives issues
in the fight of doping.) Implementing the WADC in some discipline would contribute
to establishing a strict anti-doping regime. As it turns out, however, the problem of the
WADC is the lack of compliance on the part of the international sports associations (Em-
rich and Pierdzioch, 2012). For example, the following prominent sports associations are
reported to refuse the WADC: the International Football Association (FIFA), the Interna-
tional Tennis Federation (ITF), and the International Cycling Association (UCI) (Emrich
and Pierdzioch, 2012).27 Another indication that there need not be serious doping tests
although many efforts in the fight against doping are claimed is the charter formulated
December 2-3, 2012, by a current movement called “change cycling now.” The move-
ment consists of sports journalists, former cycling officials, as well as of former cyclists,
including a Tour de France winner. The charter strongly requests that the organization
responsible for doping tests becomes independent and thus indirectly accuses the current
institution as not being so. The charter expresses this as a principle to create doping-free
cycling in the future: “The responsibility for deciding who is tested, when they are tested,
and what drugs they are tested for, must reside in an independent entity that is beyond
the control of the UCI.”28 Thus, even in cycling, where there is a long list of detected
dopers, it seems that the probability of being detected when doped is not that high. We
argue that in any discipline there are incentives to put insufficient effort into the detection
of dopers. In the light of our results, the few spectacular cases of convicted dopers are
not delinquent exceptions (bad apples), but rather unlucky cheaters or scapegoats.
Let us now return to our model and discuss efficiency.
26Of course, there are also other reasons, why detected doping leads to losses. For example, a national
sports association might have an interest that athletes from its country are successful in international
competition.
27The WADA does not have effective instruments to punish organizations that do not comply.





Proposition 2 shows that the unique equilibrium outcome is d-n-s, which means that
doping is prevalent. Whether this is a socially desirable outcome is not uncontroversial in
the literature (Savulescu et al., 2004). Let us discuss the assumptions that decide upon
efficiency. In our model the following assumption assures that d-n-s is indeed inefficient
in the strong sense of being Pareto dominated.
Assumption 3 (controversial). For the preferences of the three players we assume the
following:
Ath: c-t-s Ath d-n-s Ath d-t-s, i.e. Athletes prefer being tested and clean over being not
tested when doped over being tested and doped.
Org: c-t-s Org d-n-s, i.e. Organizers prefer the testing of clean Athletes over not testing
doped Athletes.
Cus: c-t-s Cus d-n-s, i.e. Customers weakly prefer tested clean Athletes over not tested
doped Athletes.
Note that Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are mutually consistent (i.e. there is at least
one complete and transitive preference ordering for each player on all the outcomes such
that the three assumptions are satisfied). The Assumptions A3 are plausible, but ar-
guably much more controversial than A1 and A2. Athletes might dislike doping tests
even if they are clean, because they have to be constantly available. However, we assume
that Athletes are better off by being tested and clean than being doped, e.g. because dop-
ing would seriously affect their health. Organizers might have high costs of conducting
doping tests and they might benefit from the performance of doped Athletes such that
we had d-n-s Org c-t-s. However, we take the view of benevolent Organizers who prefer
to detect doped Athletes (as long as Customers stay) such that the relation is just the
opposite. Finally, for Customers we keep the view that they cannot distinguish between
the outcomes that do not include a scandal. Thus, d-n-s ∼Cus c-t-s ∼Cus c-n-s.
Clearly, under Assumptions A3, outcome d-n-s is Pareto dominated by outcome c-t-s.
Thus, the unique equilibrium outcome in our model is not Pareto efficient. Outcome c-t-s,
however is not Pareto dominated by any other outcome as established by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Pareto Efficiency). Suppose Assumptions A1 and A3 hold. Then outcome
d-n-s is not Pareto efficient, while outcome c-t-s is.
Proof. The implication that d-n-s is Pareto dominated by c-t-s is immediate from A3.
To establish that c-t-s is Pareto efficient, let us show that for any other outcome d-t-s,
d-n-s,..., c-t-l, c-n-l there is at least one player who strictly prefers outcome c-t-s. From
A3 we get: c-t-s Ath d-n-s Ath d-t-s. A3 and A1 imply that c-t-s Ath d-n-s Ath c-n-s.
From A1 we get: c-t-s Ath d-t-l. From A1 we get: c-t-s Cus d-n-s Cus d-n-l. From A1
we get: c-t-s Ath c-t-l. Finally, from A1 we get: c-t-s Org c-n-l.
In this section we have shown that we are indeed in a social dilemma situation. The
unique equilibrium outcome, which involves doping, is Pareto dominated by a doping-free
outcome. The next question is how the institutions can be changed such that the Pareto
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Figure 2: Structure of the game with well-informed Customers.
efficient outcome c-t-s becomes an equilibrium outcome. If the controversial assumption
A3 is not accepted, then the doping equilibrium need not be Pareto dominated. Still,
however, it is of high interest to find conditions for a doping-free equilibrium.
4 Inducing a Doping-free Equilibrium
We first establish the results, then we discuss current policy suggestions in the light of
the model.
4.1 Change of Customers’ Information Structure
In order to induce an outcome without doping, we change the information structure in the
game. In particular, we let the Customers be also informed about doping tests that turned
out to be negative. Consider the extensive game tree illustrated in Figure 2. As before,
Organizers decide on testing the Athletes without observing whether there was doping or
not. The Customers then decide upon staying a supporter or leaving. The information
they have for this decision now consists of three information sets: one is after a scandal
(Dope, Test), one after a negative test (Clean, Test), and one after no test, which consists
of two histories (Dope,Notest) and (Clean,Notest). This yields eight strategies for the
Customers, which we denote by {SSS, SSL, SLS, SLL,LSS, LSL, LLS, LLL}, such that
the first letter stands for the action after a scandal, the second letter for the action after
a negative test, and the third letter for the action if there were no tests.
In the game with the coarse information structure (studied in the former section),
under Assumptions A1 and A2 the unique equilibrium outcome involved doping. The
following proposition shows that with finer information structure there is a doping-free
equilibrium, as well.
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Proposition 4 (doping-free equilibrium). Under Assumptions A1 and A2 there are two
SPNE in the game with finer information structure: sˆ := (Clean, Test, LSL) and s∗∗ :=
(Dope,Notest, LSS).
Proof. The game has two proper subgames: one starts at node (Dope, Test) and one
starts at node (Clean, Test), cf. Figure 2. In both subgames only Customers act and by
assumption A1 they will choose Leave in the first one and Stay in the second one. Thus,
in each SPNE the Customers’ strategy is either LSL or LSS. The following matrices show














Matrix 3 leads to mutual best replies (Clean, Test). LSL is also a best reply to (Clean, Test)
because c-t-s Cus c-t-l by A1 such that sˆ is a SPNE. There are no other equilibria with
LSL because A2 yields deviations from outcomes d-n-l and c-n-l, while d-t-l is not a
candidate because, again, c-t-s Ath d-t-l by A1.
Matrix 4 leads to mutual best replies (Dope,Notest) (as already shown in proof of
Proposition 2). LSS is also a best reply to (Dope,Notest) because d-n-s Cus d-n-l by
A1. There are no other equilibria with LSS because A2 yields deviations from outcomes
c-t-s and c-n-s, while d-t-l is not a candidate because c-t-s Ath d-t-l by A1.
Proposition 4 shows that a change in the information structure in our model is suffi-
cient to obtain a doping-free equilibrium. Thus, the social dilemma can be overcome by
establishing transparency. However, this result comes with (at least) two caveats. First,
the doping-free equilibrium involves suboptimal behavior outside the equilibrium path.
(Indeed, after no test, the equilibrium strategy of the customers LSL implies to leave,
although this is not in line with Assumption A1. Subgame perfectness simply does not
rule out this aspect.) Second, there is still another equilibrium which involves doping. To
solve these two issues at once, we would need different preferences of the Customers.
4.2 Change of Customers’ Preferences
Let us now assume preferences for the Customers that induce uniqueness of a doping-free
equilibrium, even if these assumptions might be counterfactual. Suppose that d-n-l Cus
d-n-s and c-n-l Cus c-n-s, i.e. Customers preferred to withdraw their support if there
are no doping tests. This is in contradiction to Assumptions A1. Let us change A1 to
A1’ such that these two orderings have changed, while all other binary comparisons are
left unchanged. This change of preference reflects that Customers are now more skeptical
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about doping practices and therefore now insists on the proof of clean sports in order
to stay a supporter. The change in preferences is strong enough to rule out all doping
equilibria as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5 (Counterfactual). Under Assumptions A1’ and A2
sˆ = (Clean, Test, LSL) is the unique SPNE in the game with well-informed Customers.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is fully analogous to the first and second part of
the proof of Proposition 4 because no assumption of A1’ is used that does not coincide
with the assumptions in A1. That is, we can restrict attention to two strategies of the
Customers LSL and LSS, while for LSL, cf. Matrix 3, we find the mutual best response as
(Clean, Test) such that (Clean, Test, LSL) is a SPNE. For the case of LSS, cf. Matrix 4,
now the difference between A1’ and A1 becomes relevant. Matrix 4, again, leads to best
replies (Dope,Notest). However, LSS is not a best reply to (Dope,Notest) because d-n-l
Cus d-n-s by A1’. Again, there are no other equilibria with LSS because A2 yields
deviations from outcomes c-t-s and c-n-s, while d-t-l is not a candidate because c-t-s Ath
d-t-l by A1.
As the proposition shows, with Customers who only stay after clean sport has been
proven, there is only a doping-free equilibrium. Moreover, there is no more issue of
suboptimal behavior outside the equilibrium path because the Customers’ threat to leave
after no tests is now credible. It thus not only takes a better information level for the
Customers but also a change in preferences: they would have to insist on doping tests in
order to induce incentives for a doping-free sport.
4.3 Implications for Anti-Doping Policies
In the literature on doping incentives various approaches are suggested to solve the doping
issue. Many of them concern the change of incentives on part of the athletes. On one
hand it is suggested to change the punishments or to increase the fines for being doped
(e.g. Haugen, 2004). In the light of our model, however, this approach is not effective
since in equilibrium athletes are not tested and thus do not get punished. On the other
hand the suggestion is to decrease the benefits of doping, e.g. by reducing the prize spread
between different ranks or by reducing the number of competitions (Eber and The´pot,
1999). But also decreasing the benefits of doping only affects the behavior of athletes if it
succeeds in making doping less attractive than not doping, (i.e. the payoff of doping must
be reduced to such an extent that the ordinal preference that we assume in the model
switches direction). As long as the probability of being caught is small, this seems to be
at least questionable.
Thus, for Athletes which are calculating dopers any anti-doping instrument has to
make sure that the probability that doping is punished is sufficiently high. In this paper
we have identified the lack of the Organizers’ incentives to really implement such a regime.
A rather radical solution to these misguided incentives is to replace the actors that are
responsible for doping tests. Indeed, it is currently debated in several countries (among
them Germany) whether to establish a legislation that makes the state and its body
responsible for the prosecution of dopers.29 In some states, e.g. Belgium, this is already
implemented. In principle, the proposed shift of responsibility is a solution to the lack of
29The discussion caught new fire with the recent case of Lance Armstrong.
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control since the police and the courts do not have the conflict of interest that NADAs
and sports associations have. However, this approach is only fruitful if it is practically
possible to fully circumvent the Organizers, i.e. if the collaboration of sports associations
and NADAs is not crucial for the prosecution of doped athletes.
In this section, we have elaborated on a different approach to fight doping. We show
how Customers can contribute to doping-free sports if they are sufficiently well-informed.
In particular, we require information about doping tests which admits Customers to con-
dition their support for the sports event on the presence of doping tests (as illustrated
in Figure 2). Whether or not Customers really insist on doping tests, then determines
the extent of doping in equilibrium (Proposition 4 and 5). Thus, a direct implication
of our model is that transparency about the doping tests and their outcomes should be
established.
This requirement is not satisfied in professional sports today. Most of the data that is
publicly available only contains cases of detected doping but not information about the
extent of testing. For example, the Internet Anti-Doping Database created by Norwegian
sports journalist Trond Husø contains more than 5000 cases, but mostly of detected
dopers. In the absence of doping scandals, this does not allow Customers to discriminate
between clean sports and undetected doping (such as illustrated in Figure 1).
One type of actors who is in principle capable of establishing transparency are sports
associations who we study as Organizers in our model. However, as argued above, such
organizations lack incentives to do so. As Dilger and Tolsdorf (2004) and Striegel et al.
(2010) even assume their lack of compliance is one reason why data on doping is so limited.
In order to achieve more transparency, the WADA could open the access to their database
called ADAMS. ADAMS was introduced to simplify the organization and realization of
doping tests.30 Currently only certain actors of the immediate sports environment are
allowed to use ADAMS. Opening the access to ADAMS seems to be a cheap way to
establish transparency, while such a policy might involve several new issues, including
the violation of privacy rights. Moreover, it can be difficult or costly to understand and
interpret the data for Customers. A much simpler suggestion is that the WADA makes
public to which extent sports associations and NADAs comply to their fight against
doping. This could be a simple rating which gives Customers a clear signal about which
disciplines and events are credible in their fight against doping. Of course, this requires
independence on part of the WADA, which is also doubted (Eber, 2002; Preston and
Szymanski, 2003), but, in principle, we conclude that there should be an independent
rating or certifying agency that officially measures to which extent certain sports events
have implemented an anti-doping regime. Whether or not doping prevails in the future is
then in the hand of the Customers.
30ADAMS has four main tasks: First, athletes are required to enter their actual wherabouts and other
users will be informed about actual infringements against reporting standards (Athlete’s Wherabouts).
Second, it is also possible to manage medical exceptional permissions (Therapeutic Use Exemptions
Management). Third, ADAMS informs about doping tests, infringements, and sentences (Information
Clearing House). Finally, ADAMS is supposed to ease the scheduling of doping tests and the preparation
of doping profiles (Doping Control Platform).
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have extended the inspection game (cf., e.g., Avenhaus et al., 2002) by a
third player: customers, who can withdraw their support. As it is shown in the application
of doping in professional sports, the behavior of critical customers accentuates the fraud-
ulent behavior.31 Customers who are ready to leave after a doping scandal, undermine
the organizers’ incentives to test athletes on performance-enhancing drugs and to convict
them on doping. As a consequence, athletes have stronger incentives to dope although
this need not be in the best interest of any of the three types of players. Our analysis
substantially strengthens the argument already outlined by Eber (2002) who comes to
the following conclusion: The institution responsible for doping controls “may have some
temptations to slacken its antidoping effort when confronted with doping affairs to pre-
serve the economic value of the shows (e.g., the Olympic Games organized by the IOC
[International Olympic Committee]). Knowing that, athletes may rationally not believe
in strong antidoping policies and may then continue to choose high levels of doping.” Our
analysis of incentives suggests that the few spectacular cases of convicted dopers are not
delinquent exceptions, but rather unlucky cheaters or scapegoats, because the probability
of being detected when doped is low (cf. Preston and Szymanski, 2003). To elaborate
on potential solutions for the doping dilemma, we show that a change in the information
structure in our model is sufficient to obtain a doping-free equilibrium (Proposition 4).
The crucial change is to establish transparency in the sense that customers know whether
there were negative tests or there were no serious tests (cf. Figure 2 versus Figure 1).
This allows customers and other stakeholders to condition their support on the presence
of serious anti-doping tests. Practically, the required transparency could be established by
a certificate or rating that shows which sports events have established a strict anti-doping
regime.
However, our model is not restricted to doping and professional sports. When fraudu-
lent activities are detected in some organization, there is a loss of reputation and critical
customers may react with a boycott. There are not few contexts, where the agent that
is able to detect the potential fraudulent activities is also affected by such a scandal.
For example, there were scandals involving well-known textile manufacturers (Nike) and
computer designers (Apple) where it turned out (or was claimed) that certain suppliers
made use of child labor. More recently, it was revealed that European parcel companies
(e.g. GLS) regularly collaborate with suppliers whose working conditions for employees
violate several standards. Consider thus a company in the role of the Organizer, who has
business relations with another firm (Athlete) that does potentially not comply to cer-
tain ethical standards. Detecting norm violations would also undermine the reputation
of the company itself. Customers who react with a boycott substantially increase the loss
of the company and thereby undermine its incentives to uncover (potential) scandals.32
When the company (Organizer) prefers not to investigate potential fraud, the number
31Other counter-intuitive results of the inspection game are already known (Holler, 1993; Andreozzi,
2004; Friehe, 2008). They concern the indifference of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which implies
that a change of payoffs for one player does not affect the equilibrium behavior of this player, but only its
opponent’s. Maximin strategies are used to address this issue (cf. Aumann and Maschler, 1972; Holler,
1990).
32There is empirical evidence on a similar issue in the context of juridical judgments: An increase in
the defined punishment, e.g. from prison sentence to capital punishment, can lead to a reduction of the
number of convictions.
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of fraudulent activities might even increase. As our model shows, this outcome can be
altered if customers are informed about control activities of all companies by some inde-
pendent institution. Thus, transparency is necessary in order to overcome this type of
social dilemma.
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